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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Property Rights and Growth Management
in Florida: Balancing Opportunity and
Responsibility in a Changing
Political Climate
MICHAEL MURPHY*

A working growth management system can and will separate urban and rural areas in a way that protects open
space, farmland, water recharge areas, wetlands and our
sensitive coastal areas, and yet provide the land, density,
and infrastructure needed for residential, commercial and
industrial development.'
The private property rights movement is about freedom
and fairness; just as we have the responsibility to protect
and preserve our environment, the right to own and use
property must be protected in order to preserve individual
liberty from the capricious actions of powerful government
bureaucrats. 2
* The author would like to thank his wife, Margie, for her love and support. Special thanks to Professor John R. Nolon and Professor Jayne E. Daly
for sharing their knowledge of land use law. Also special thanks to Caryn E.
Gerst and Andrea Herbst and her group for making this a better article.
1. Gil Klein, Florida Officials Search for the 'Missing Pieces' in Plan to
Manage State's Growth, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 14, 1984, at 1
(quoting John DeGrove, then head of Florida's Department of Community Affairs) [hereinafter Klein, Missing Pieces).
2. Rep. Ken Pruitt, Squaring Off On Property Rights: Respect Private
Property, FLORIDA TREND, Mar. 1992, at 62. Rep. Pruitt is a member of the
Florida House of Representatives and one of the sponsors of the Bert J. Harris,
Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act. Id.
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I. Introduction
Florida's new property rights law has cast a long shadow
over its growth management system. Growth management
seeks to preserve the quality of life for present and future
generations by: (1) requiring all levels of state government to
work together to achieve common goals, (2) calling upon individual landowners to forego some of their economic opportunities to preserve opportunities for future generations, and
(3) mandating continuous assessment and revision of the
growth management process itself to meet constantly changing conditions.3 Touted as a compromise between property
rights advocates and growth management advocates, the new
property rights law may shake the very foundations of the
most comprehensive growth management system in the
4
United States.
The controversy surrounding an individual's real property rights can be reduced to one issue: whether an individual property owner or the general public should bear the cost
of economic impacts of governmental laws or regulations.
Although the issue is clear, the answer is ambiguous. This
ambiguity arises from the conflict inherent in the land user's
attempt to maximize economic opportunity while concurrently exercising both responsibility and restraint.5 However, this has always been an uneasy balance and, most
recently, the property rights debate has arrived at the fore6
front of the political landscape.
Since the early 1990s, legislatures of all fifty states and
the federal government have considered measures to bolster
private property rights.7 Most property rights advocates
want to reign in government regulation involving land use
3. See infra part Hl. B.
4. See Larry Kaplow, Property Rights Bill Readied, PALM BEAcH PoST,
Apr. 16, 1995, at 1A, 8A; The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, PALM BEACH POST,
May 7, 1995, at IA.
5. See infra part II. A.
6. See David Foster, PropertyRights Soars to New Heights, CmCAGO TRiBuirE, Aug. 19, 1995, at 1; Neal R. Peirce, Second Thoughts About Takings Meas-

ures, BALTmORE

SuN,

Dec. 18, 1995, at 13A.

7. See Peirce, supra note 6, at 13A.
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and environmental protection to preserve "one of the great
American Freedoms."s To date, eighteen states have enacted
various property rights protection laws. 9 Amongst these
states, Florida has enacted one of the strongest measures.' 0
In May, 1985, Florida's legislature overwhelmingly
passed the Growth Management Act of 1985,11 creating a
framework to handle a rapidly increasing population and development that was destroying much of the State's unique
natural resources.' 2 Ten years later, in 1995, Florida enacted
a new property rights bill, H. 863,' s allowing a landowner to
receive compensation when he demonstrates that a govern8. Private Property Rights, Hearings on S. 605 "The Omnibus Property
Rights Act of 1995" before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, Fed. Doc. Clearing House, Inc., Apr. 6, 1995 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(statement of Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary). Testifying at the same hearing, Senator Bob Dole said:
There is perhaps no greater foundation for a successful free society
than private property. Private property rights are the rights to enjoy the fruits of our labor and our ideas and deservedly enjoy special protections in the U.S. Constitution .... A regulatory state
that seems only to grow and grow - that is increasingly intrusive
- has provided the means for a sustained assault on private property rights in America. It is our duty to ensure that we limit the
arbitrary exercise of government power and pursue worthwhile
goals in ways that also protect the rights of our citizens.
Id. (prepared testimony of Senator Bob Dole, co-sponsor of S.605).
9. See Peirce, supra note 6, at 13A. See, eg., Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37221 to -223 (West 1993) (the citizens of Arizona rejected this property rights
measure in a public referendum on November 8, 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 605 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.001 to .080 (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO
CODE §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 2-5-18-1 to -11, 4-22-2-29, 32, -40 (Michie Supp. 1995); KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -711 (Supp. 1996);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601 to 3624 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. REa. STAT.
§ 536.017 (1994); N.D. CENT.CODE § 28-32-02.5 (Supp. 1995); TENN.CODE ANN.
§ 12-1-201 to -206 (Supp. 1995); TEL GOv'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001 to .045
(West
Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -4(Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-6.14:7.1 (Michie Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West
Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-1A-1 to -6 (1994).
10. See Peirce, supranote 7, at 13A. See also infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
11. H 287, Florida Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1985 History of House Bills 41.
12. See Gil Klein, Florida,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 2, 1985, at 32
[hereinafter Klein, Florida].
13. H 863, Florida Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1995 History of House Bills 268.
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14
ment action "inordinately burdens" the use of his property.
Believing that the intensity of the property rights movement
would lessen as a result of their efforts, numerous growth
management supporters endorsed this compromise bill.15
However, unconvinced the law will protect their interests,
property rights advocates promise further action to amend
the state constitution to reflect their goals.' 6
Far from being static, growth management is a process
for dealing with conditions that are constantly changing. 17
When the growth management process itself becomes unpredictable, it is ineffective.' 8 Arguably, the effects of H. 863 on
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.001-.80 (West Supp. 1996). It is unclear what
constitutes an "inordinate burden" in this context. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
15. See Tax Cap Committee, 1995-1996 Campaign Prospectus, section V
[hereinafter Tax Cap Committee]. See also Ron Bartlett, More Tax-Limit
Amendments Are Planned, TAtPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 1995, at 6; Jim Sloan,
Group Seeking Help to Amend the Constitution;Changes Include Proposalsthat
Deal with Taxes, Compensation, TAmPA TRmuNE, Dec. 14, 1995, at 1.
16. See supra note 15.
17. See The PropertyAppeasers, ST. PETERSBURG TMIEs, July 9, 1995, at 2D
(referring to comments made by Tom Pelham, former Secretary of the State
Department of Community Affairs in Florida).
18. Several writers describe how processes and systems operate, survive
and evolve surrounded by ever changing conditions. See MumAy GELL-MNmN,
Tim QUARK AND THE JAGUAR (1994); ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT oF CHAos: MAN'S NEW DALOGUE WITH NATURE (1984); W. Brian Arthur, Complexity in Economic Theory: Inductive Reasoning and Bounded
Rationality,84 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 406 (1994).
Research on the sciences of simplicity and complexity... naturally
includes teasing out the meaning of the simple and the complex,
but also the similarities and the differences among complex adaptive systems, functioning in such diverse processes as the origin of
life on Earth, biological evolution, the behavior of organisms in ecological systems, the operation of the mammalian immune system,
learning and rethinking in animals (including human beings), the
evolution of human societies....
The common feature of all these processes is that in each one a complex adaptive system acquires information about its environment
and its own interaction with that environment, identifring regularities in that information, condensing those regularities into a kind
of "schema" or model, and acting in the real world on the basis of
that schema.
MURRAY GELL-MANN, T1E QUARK AND THE JAGUAR, 17 (1994) (emphasis added).
[Tihe faster the communication takes place within a system, .-. . the
more stable the system ....
[Tihe more complex the system, the
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growth management will be negligible because it only acts
prospectively. However, this prospective characteristic frustrates the dynamic nature of a successful growth management system since state and local governments will become
hesitant in responding to changing circumstances.
The State's growth management framework represents a
tremendous commitment towards preserving a quality of life
and opportunity for future generations of Floridians.' 9 This
commitment requires both the individual landowner and
20
present generations to exercise restraint and responsibility.
Yet, the impact of this property rights law shifts responsibilmore numerous are the types of fluctuations that threaten its stability. How then, it has been asked, can systems as complex as ecological or human organizations possibly exist? How do they
manage to avoid permanent chaos? The stabilizing effect of communication, of diffusion processes, could be a partial answer to theses questions. In complex systems, where species and individuals
interact in many different ways, diffusion and communication
among various parts of the system are likely to be efficient. There
is competition between stabilization through communication and
instability through fluctuations. The outcome of that competition
determines the threshold of stability.
PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAWS NEw DIA-

ILYA
LOGUE WITH NATURE

187-89 (1984).

How do we humans reason in situations that are complicated or illdefined? .... [We are superb at seeing or recognizing or matching
patterns-behaviors that confer obvious evolutionary benefits. In
problems of complication then, we look for patterns; and we simplify the problem by using these to construct temporary internal
models or hypotheses or schemata to work with ....
(Wihen we
cannot fully reason or lack full definition of the problem, we use
simple models to fill the gaps in our understanding.
W. Brian Arthur, Complexity in Economic Theory: Inductive Reasoning and
Bounded Rationality, 84 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 406, 406-07 (1994).
19. See infra note 56. Three years after the growth management act was
passed in Florida one writer described growth management as:
nothing more than basic common sense. Don't build where there's
already too much built. Don't develop without decent roads,
enough water, and ways to get rid of everybody's garbage and sewage. That such an elementary standard has created such an uproar
only reveals the depth of crisis in this growing state.
Jon East, Florida'sBalancing Act: Growth Law Begins to Pinch, ST. PETERSBURG TomES, Mar. 13, 1988, at 1D.
20. The application of growth management necessarily requires the imposition of some restrictions on the use of land. Land use restrictions are not new,
but growth management attempts to integrate them to ensure that land will
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ity for land resource protection from the individual landowner to the general public. 21 At a minimum, the public
must accept this added responsibility if growth management
is to remain effective. On a more significant level, it unfairly
shifts the burden of preserving the quality of life from the
present generation to future generations because it is the future generations who must pay for the compromise of today.
Finally, a healthy growth management framework requires a cooperative approach by all levels of government.
However, since limited financial resources are available, especially at the local government level, this property rights
law will pit state and local governments against one another,
thereby destroying any integrated effort towards growth
management. Numerous local governments have already decided not to amend local regulations because of such financial
22
constraints.
This Article examines the practical and legal consequences of the Property Rights Act in relation to Florida's
growth management system. Part II describes the land ethics of opportunity and responsibility in the context of sustainable development and as the guiding principles behind the
growth management and property rights movements. It then
assesses growth management in Florida by focusing on efforts to control development prior to 1985 and the Growth
Management Act of 1985. Part III examines property rights
law in Florida, including current takings law and the recently
enacted property rights law. Part IV analyzes the possible
effects of the new legislation on Florida's growth management system. The Article concludes that the property rights
develop in an integrated fashion. See infra notes 172, 308 and accompanying
text.
21. By requiring compensation to be paid to landowners who are inordinately burdened by a government regulation, the general public, rather than
the landowner, will bare the "cost" of that regulation. See infra part IV.
22. See Rose, Deland Should Move Ahead, ORLANDo SmrrnqL, Aug. 29,
1995, at AB; Speculators' Paradise, PAx~ BEACH PosT, June 11, 1995, at 2F;
Nanette Woitas, New Law Angers Commission; The PropertyRights Act Could
Cost County Millions, Force a Tax Increase,TAiPA TRmunuE, May 31, 1995, at 1.
Other vague provisions also have the potential of driving the wedge further
between state and local governments as time goes by. See infra part IV. C.
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bill, in fulfilling its mandate, will necessarily frustrate Florida's efforts to achieve its growth management goals.
II. Background
A. Placing the Land Use Ethics of Opportunity and
Responsibility into an Inter-generational Context.
During his life, Aldo Leopold, a renowned conservation23
ist, called upon Americans to embrace a new land ethic.
Prompted by the unchecked decline and disappearance of
many of the country's natural resources, he wrote that:
[a]ll ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that
the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his
place in the community, but his ethics prompt him also to
cooperate .... The land ethic simply enlarges the boundary of the community to include soils,
waters, plants, and
24
animals, or collectively: the land.

However, his hope of a unified land use ethic has not
been realized. 25 Instead, land use decisions are founded on a
variety of apparently conflicting land use ethics. 26 For exam23. See Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order,Reform, Responsibility,
Opportunity, 24 ENVIL. L. 1439, 1440 (1994).

24. ALDO

LEOPOLD,

A SAND CouNTY ALuANAC 238 (1949).

25. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 1440.
26. See id. at 1441. Professor Bosselman has identified four land ethics,
each having strong historical roots, which have influenced "the way people regard the land in the United States." Id. They are order, reform, responsibility,
and opportunity. See id.
Those who embrace the ethic of order seek stability in the social structure. See
id. at 1506. In the past, followers have justified their decisions by pointing to
the hardship and misery created by disorder. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at
1446. Today, deed restrictions and local zoning are modem examples of land
use decisions that seek to preserve social order. See id. at 1506.
Reformers, on the other hand, seek to achieve "greater equity" in society and
object to many of the privileges enjoyed by landowners at the expense of those
who do not own land. Id. at 1458. For example, reformers challenge the notion
of agricultural subsidies and the low cost of mining on federal lands. See id. at
1507.
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ple, two land ethics, opportunity and responsibility, seem
27
wholly irreconcilable.
The land ethic of opportunity has its roots in Utilitarianism where "an action is [considered] good if it contributes to
maximizing the happiness of the greatest number of human
beings."28 Followers believe an individual should be afforded
the widest practical range of choices with minimal limitations. 2 9 Thus, Utilitarians believe the government's role
should be restricted to penalizing "bad actions" to deter similar actions in the future.30
The ethic of opportunity is a driving force behind today's
property rights movement challenging the validity of regulations which restrict the use of property. 3 ' Yet, against that
movement, it is quite clear that the right to use one's land as
one sees fit is not absolute. Jurisprudential thinking has long
held that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."3 2
27. See id. at 1485. Although Bosselman identifies four land ethics, this
article addresses only the ethics of opportunity and responsibility because their
unique significance in an inter-generational context. See infra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text for a discussion of sustainable development and the role of
the ethics of opportunity and responsibility in the context of growth management. Certainly, the other two ethics are relevant also. Growth management
embraces the ethic of order in that it introduces an element of predictability to
our patterns of land use. Reformers can properly support growth management
because, although the rights of landowners are respected, the needs of the entire community are served.
28. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 1486.
29. See id. at 1490 n.227.
30. See id. at 1487.
31. See Pruitt,supra note 2, at 63.
32. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (citing Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877)). The preceding ideas do not necessarily conflict.
The issue is not whether landowners should be compensated every time a governmental action adversely impacts the use of their land; the answer is no.
Neither is the issue whether government should be free of the requirement to
compensate landowners adversely impacted by its actions; again, the answer is
no. The fundamental task is where to draw the dividing line between those
actions that should require the payment of compensation and those that should
not. This is not an easy task. An action that prohibits a land use because it is
'injurious to the community' and an action that prohibits a land use because it
'benefits the community' (and, therefore, should be paid for) are often opposite

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/18
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Conversely, followers of the land ethic of responsibility,
who are deeply concerned with the depletion of natural resources, seek to preserve unique natural areas.3 3 John Muir,
founder of the Sierra Club, is representative of those "for
whom land means responsibility."3 4 Muir viewed land as sacred3 5 and urged government action to preserve unique habitats and resources.3 6 Modern Muirists focus their efforts on
areas such as wetlands preservation and the responsible use
37
of toxic chemicals on land.
The search for a single consistent land ethic appears futile; certainly, the ethics of opportunity and responsibility
seem wholly irreconcilable in the context of society's present
needs and desires. For example, a landowner who either decides to or is forced to preserve a natural resource on his land
ordinarily forgoes some economic opportunity to exploit the
resource itself or uses the land for some other purpose.38
Thus, it has been suggested that each ethic individually
sides of the same coin. Any discussion on the takings issue usually reduces to
constitutional semantics.
33. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 1476-77.

34. Id. at 1441. During his life, Muir wrote about many of the natural areas
he encountered on his travels throughout the United States. Coming from a
deeply religious background, his writings abounded with religious themes in his
description of what he saw. His writings increased public awareness about natural resources depletion. See id. at part IV.
35. See id. at 1479.

36. See id. at 1482-83. For example, his efforts greatly influenced the creation of the national park system. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 1481. Muir
once described Yosemite as "a grand page of mountain manuscript that I would
gladly give my life to be able to read." Id. (quoting JoHN Mum, My FIRST SuMiER IN THE SIERRA 102 (Gretel Ehrlich ed., 1987)).
37. See id. at 1508.
38. The wetlands protection program under the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act are seen as the most intrusive of current federal programs. See Property Rights, Regulatory Takings, and Environmental Protection: Proposals for Statutory Compensation. Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on the Environment and Public Works, Fed. Doc. Clearing House,
Inc., July 12, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (statement
of Jonathon H. Adler, Director of Environmental Studies for the Competitive
Enterprise Institute).
For two decades, federal land-use control has been the dominant
means of achieving many environmental objectives. As a result,
the federal government has denied countless landowners the reasonable use land in the name of environmental protection; property

9
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should be considered as factors in any decision having an im9
3
pact on land.

Leopold's vision of a broader "community" appears impossible to achieve on a practical level. 40 However, the historical understanding of property ownership in this country
is that its expectations must consider the public welfare. 41
During the time when the landscape appeared endless, this
perspective must have been easily embraced because any impact on the landowner's autonomy was negligible.42 It is not
surprising then that the property rights movement would
gain momentum at the same time that the reality of a finite
land resource emerged, the preservation of which requires
sacrifice. 43 However, such a sacrifice becomes necessary and
understandable when land use decisions consider future genowners are finding their land effectively taken from them without
compensation.
The two federal laws responsible for the lion's share of regulatory
takings are the Endangered Species Act and Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act ....The primary reason that current approaches
to environmental protection engender conflict and opposition is that
they trample on the property rights of individual Americans, often
bankrupting them in the process.
39. See Bosselman, supra note 23, at 1441.
40. Leopold sought to include responsibility into man's relationship with
the land. He saw the existing "land-relation [as] ...strictly economic, entailing
privileges but not obligations." LEOPOLD, supra note 24, at 239. Economic reality for a landowner is such that the preservation of a natural resource will usually weigh less than a present need or desire to take advantage of an economic
opportunity.
41. See Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a 'Broader
Vision' of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989).
42. See John A. Humbach, Law and the New Land Ethic, 74 MIWN. L. Rav.
339, 340 (1989).
43. To gain an appreciation of this shrinking resource, consider the following estimates of population in the United States in the past:
YEAR
POPULATION
1790
3.9 million

1840

17 million

1890
1940

62 million
132 million

1990

250 million

HistoricalStatistics: Distributionof U.S. Population (1790 to 1990), available
in WESTLAW, CENDATA database.
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erations. In fact, this is the hallmark of sustainable
development.
Sustainable development, which applies equally to developed and developing nations," calls upon present generations to meet their needs without compromising the needs
of future generations. 45 In essence, as this writer points
out, sustainable development links opportunity and
responsibility:
[slustainable development implies that future generations
have as much right as the present generation to a robust
environment with which to meet their own needs and preferences .... As members of the present generation, we are
both trustees of the environment with obligations to care
for it for future generations, and beneficiaries entitled to
use it for our own well-being. In brief, each generation
has both rights and obligations in relation to the
46
environment.
Exercising responsibility in land use is not necessarily
about destroying opportunity; rather, it preserves opportunity for those who follow. In this inter-generational context,
a tremendous responsibility attaches to the ownership and
use of land.
As a principle, sustainable development seems an obscure guide to individuals making a mundane decision about
how to use their land. 47 However, this concept becomes more
48
concrete when "associated with a given geographical area."

Further, sustainability has two basic requirements: a general consensus on the concept of sustainable development,

44. See U.N. WoRLD ColnnssIoN ON ENvmonwNT AND DEVELOPmNT, OUR
COr1m5ON FuTuRE 43 (1987).

45. See id.
46. Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A
Comment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123, 2123 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Deciphering Sustainable Development,
69 Cm.-KENrr L. REv. 977 (1994).
48. Jayne E. Daly, Toward Sustainable Development: In Our Common Interest, Commemorative Edition PACE L. REv. 153, 159 (1995).

11

280

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

49 Florida is a "geand a strategic framework for achieving it.
ographical area" that lends itself to sustainable development,
and growth management 50 certainly provides the "framework" for Floridians to develop their land in a manner that
preserves opportunity and maintains a preferred quality of
life for future generations.5 ' In this context, the ethics of opportunity and responsibility are no longer contradictory; instead, and quite the opposite, they become inseparable.
Jurisprudential thinking corresponds with this conceptual background. There is no absolute right for an owner to
use his property as he sees fit.52 Presently, the government
may legitimately restrict land use to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare.53 At some point, however, the exercise of this power can go "too far" and give rise to a claim for
just compensation (i.e. a "taking") under the Constitution.5 4
Generally, those who believe a taking results from any
non-nuisance governmental restriction on the use of privately
49. See U.N. WORLD Coi~NussioN ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 44, at 43.
50. See infra note 56 and accompanying text for an explanation of growth
management.
51. In 1985 there was a general consensus in Florida that something

needed to be done about future land development. See infra Part H B.2. However, the enactment of the property rights bill and the debate that continues to
surround it indicates that there is no longer a general consensus as to how
Floridians see their future.
52. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
placement of the land ethic of opportunity within the context of private property
rights.
53. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125
(1978).
54. Interestingly, this "point" is not readily determined. The Supreme
Court has dismissed the idea that there is any "set formula" for determining
whether or not there is a taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. at 124). Instead, courts have held that there must be a factual inquiry
to see if the regulation goes "too far." See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUm
L. REv. 782 (1995) (reasoning that the original understanding ofjust compensation mandated compensation only in those cases where the political process
failed to adequately consider affected property rights). But see Michael DeBow,
Unjust Compensation: The ContinuingNeed for Reform, 46 S.C. L. Rlv. 579
(1995) (concluding that current takings law and practice at the federal and
state level are inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
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owned land support legislatively created causes of action for
compensation because it will offset the "injustices" that occur
under current judicial interpretations of constitutional takings law.55 Because there are two opposing, and arguably rational, interpretations of the takings clause, it becomes
necessary to rely on ethical considerations to analyze Florida's new cause of action and its possible implications for the
State's growth management system.
B. Growth Management in Florida
Growth management systems embrace careful planning
processes in an attempt to balance the need for further development in the future with the impact of such development. 56
To date, ten states have embraced a variety of growth management frameworks.5 7 Florida, however, is the only "large"
55. See Randy Schultz, Yum, Yum, A Tax Cap; Don't Bite, PALM BEAcH
POST, Dec. 10, 1995, at IF; Sloan, supra note 15, at 1. Both articles describe the
platform of the Tax Cap Committee, considered to be one of the leading groups
behind the property rights movement in Florida. See also infra notes 176-85
and accompanying text for the perspective of current property rights advocates.
56. See JOHN M. DEGRovE, TnE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PL aA-NQr
AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES 1 (1992) (hereinafter THE NEw
FRoNTIRr).
Properly defined and understood, growth management... has central to its meaning a commitment to plan carefully for the growth
that comes to an area so as to achieve a responsible balance between the protection of natural systems . . . and .. . development ....
It is deeply committed to a responsible Wfit"
between
development and the infrastructure needed to support the impacts
of development.... Thus growth management is closely linked to,
and necessary for, the achievement of "quality of life," a concept
that has emerged as a powerful, if somewhat elusive, framework for
... growth management systems.
Id.
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996);
FLA STAT. ANN. 39 186.001-.911 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 187.101-.201 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); FL& STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.515
(West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-70-1 to -5 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-8-1 to
-222 (1994 & Supp. 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4311-49 (West
1996) (amending and repealing the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use
Regulation Act, 1989 Me. Laws 104); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 3.05, 3.06,
4.09, 7.03 (Supp. 1994); Mn. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & Paoc. §§ 5-402, 5-701 to
5-7A-032, 8-403 (1995 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-196 to -207
(West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 45.22.2-1 to -14 (1991 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-95 (1992
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58
state to enact such a system.

1. Efforts to Deal with Florida's Growth Problem
before 1985
Florida never seriously considered controlling development until the early 1970s when population growth, once
viewed as essential to ongoing prosperity, was recognized as
one of the State's most serious problems. 59 Florida's population had grown from 2.7 million in 1950, to 4.5 million by
1960, to nearly 7 million by 1970.60 With an ever increasing
population came an increasing demand for land and development which, in turn, created employment. 6 1 However, with
few land use controls in place, development occurred in a
haphazard fashion.6 2 By the late 1960s into the early 1970s,
the negative impacts of this uncontrolled development, such
as salt water intrusion into drinking water supplies in southern Florida, became apparent. 63
In the midst of one of the harshest droughts to ever hit
Florida, Governor Askew convened the South Florida Water
Management Conference in 1971, where he questioned the
value of future uncontrolled growth.64 The following year,
the Governor appointed the Task Force on Resource Manage& Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6001-6108 (1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 36.70A.010 - .902 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996). See generally
JOHN M. DEGROVE, THE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PLANNING AND

GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES (1993); David L. Calies, The Quiet
Revolution Continues:A QuarterCentury of Progress,26 URB. LAW. 197 (1994);

John H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging
New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV.
489 (1994).
58. See THE NEW FRoNTIER, supra note 56, at 7. Florida is currently fourth
in population size after California, New York and Texas, none of which has a

growth management system in place. Id.
59. See 1000 FaiENDs OF FLORIDA, GROWTH MANAGEMENT 2000: MAKNG IT
WORK 1 (1992) [hereinafter GROWTH MANAGEMENT 2000].
60. See THE NEW FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 8.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See H. Glenn Boggs & Robert C. Apgar, Concurrencyand Growth Management: Lawyer's Primer,7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 3 (1991) (hereinafter
Boggs].
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ment 65 whose efforts resulted in the Legislature passing four
bills geared towards protecting the environment while accommodating future development. 66 Specifically, under the Environmental Land and Water Management Act,67 both the
Critical Area 68 and Development of Regional Impact (DRI)69

70
programs were created and still remain the law today.
In 1975, on the recommendation of the Environmental
Land Management Study Committee (ELMS I), the Florida
Legislature enacted the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act in response to the continuing lack of appropriate development. 7 1 Although local governments were required to adopt comprehensive plans to deal with future
growth under the new law, the state had no effective legal
72
means to ensure compliance.
Despite some successes, 73 it became clear by the early
1980s that more controls were needed. In 1983, Florida's
65. See id.
66. See THE NEW FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 9. The four laws were: the
Environmental Land and Water Management Act (FL,& STAT. ch. 380 (1972));
the State Comprehensive Planning Act (FLA. STAT. ch. 23 (1972)); the Water
Resources Act (FLA. STAT. cl. 373 (1972)); and the Land Conservation Act (FLA.
STAT. cl. 259 (1972)).
67. FLA. STAT. ANN. cl. 380 (Harrison 1972).
68. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 380.05 (West 1988). Under the current program,
areas of critical concern to the state are recommended by the state land planning agency to the Administration Commission along with "recommendations
with respect to the purchase of lands situated within the boundaries of the proposed area as environmentally endangered lands and outdoor recreation lands
under the Land Conservation Act of 1972." Id. § 380.05(1)(a). Within 45 days,
the Commission must either reject the recommendation or adopt the recommendation with or without modification and by rule designate the area of critical state concern. See Id. § 380.05(I)(b).
69. See id. § 380.06. The DRI program requires an extensive review of major developments whose "character, magnitude or location would have a substantial effect upon the safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county."
FI. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(1) (West 1988). The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) was also established at that time to implement both of these programs. See id. § 380.0031(18).
70. See Boggs, supra note 64, at 4.
71. FLA. STAT. ANN.cl. 163 (Harrison 1975).
72. See Boggs, supra note 64, at 5.
73. See THE Nnv FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 9. Florida was leading the
nation in its efforts to manage its water resources (Water Resources Act). Significant public land acquisition also took place (Land Conservation Act). Under
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population reached 9.7 million and was predicted to reach
17.4 million by the end of the century. 74 In just over thirty
years, Florida grew from the twenty-seventh to the seventh
75
most populous state.
There were two significant problems with the existing
scheme: (1) there was insufficient funding 76 for infrastruc-

ture improvements and for the creation of local comprehensive plans, 7 7 and (2) there was inadequate state approval

authority over local comprehensive plans which were created. 78 Moreover, existing laws did not require an adequate
infrastructure to be in place before development occurred. 79
Thus, development proceeded without any assurance that adequate supporting facilities such as water and sewer would
follow.
In response, then Governor, Bob Graham, established
the Environmental Land Management Study Committee II
(ELMS II) whose task was to develop "clear and strong language... for an integrated policy framework to shape and
guide the future of Florida into the twenty-first century."8 0
Most legislation involving growth management enacted over
the following three years reflected the recommendations of
ELMS H1.81
the DRI program, large exaction fees ensured that the necessary infrastructure
to support the DRI developments were put in place. Id.
74. See Wayne Snow, DCA Secretary Says State Must Act Now to Manage
Growth, UPI, Nov. 22, 1983 (AM cycle), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
75. See Klein, Missing Pieces, supra note 1, at 1. Increasing population
pressures prompted one leading Floridian economist to declare that "[t]he train
of population growth has already left the station." Klein, Florida,supra note
12, at 32.
76. See THE NEW FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 10.
77. See Klein, Missing Pieces, supra note 1, at 1. For example, it was predicted that an eight lane highway, a year away from completion, would be unable to deal with the traffic from anticipated development. See id.
78. See Tnx NEW FRoNTiER, supra note 56, at 10-11. As a result, local plans
were constantly changed at the whims of local councils. See id.
79. See GROWTH MANAGEM.NT 2000, supra note 59, at 3.
80. THE NEw FRoNTIER, supra note 56, at 10.
81. See id. at 11.
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2. The Growth Management Act of 1985
Traditionally at odds with each other, developers and environmental groups united to support the proposed growth
management legislation in 1985.82 One year earlier, Florida
enacted the State and Regional Planning Act of 1984.83 The
Act mandated both the creation of a state plan to be
presented to the Legislature the following year 8 4 and the creation of regional planning councils 85 which were assigned the
responsibility of developing regional policy plans.8 6 The following year, the Legislature adopted the Comprehensive
State Plan (Plan)87 early in the legislative session.88 The
Plan focused on processes and end goals rather than specific
details.8 9 However, the Plan itself was intended to be passive
and could only be implemented through other legislative
acts.9 0
This set the stage for the introduction of H. 287, the
Growth Management Act of 1985. 91 The bill, which
originated in the Florida House of Representatives, contem82. See id. Developers must have been partly motivated to get involved in
the legislative process because it was inevitable that some growth management
legislation would pass that year. See William Cotterell, Graham and Legislative Leaders Talking Tough on Growth, UPI, Jan. 27, 1985 (BC cycle), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
83. FxL. STAT. ANN. clh. 186 (Harrison 1988).
84. See id. § 186.007(1).
85. See id. § 186.504.
86. See id. § 186.505.
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 187 (Harrison 1988).
88. See THE NE:w FROwNER, supra note 56, at 12.
89. See id. The plan established goals and policies in numerous areas including education, families, housing, health, public safety, water resources,
coastal marine resources, land use, transportation, and governmental efficiency. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 187.201 (West 1988). For example, with regards to
land use, the plan established the following goal:
In recognition of the importance of preserving the natural resources
and enhancing the quality of life of the state, development shall be
directed to those areas which have in place, or have agreements to
provide, the land and water resources, fiscal abilities and service
capacity to accommodate growth in an environmentally acceptable
manner.
Id. § 187.201(16)(a).
90. See id. § 187.101(1).
91. See THE NEW FR OTIER, supra note 56, at 12.
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plated extensive amendments to the Environmental Land
and Water Management Act (ELWMA)92 and the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 197593 (renamed as
the Local Government and Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act),94 and the creation of the
Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1985. 95 Offering H. 287 to the
House floor, Representative Jon Mills asserted:
growth management is really [about] whether we are going
to decide to protect the longest coastline in the South Eastern United States, whether we are going to be able to have
our kids fishing in some of the most pristine rivers in the
nation, and whether we are going to take care of some very
important lake systems .... [Tihere is no more important
issue you are going to deal with ....

People are a little

concerned about the end of this book .... This book has
been written for almost fifteen or sixteen years and we are
coming to a very important point ....

[Pleople want to

turn to the last
page but this is a process and the process is
96
not over yet.
The guiding principles behind the Growth Management Act
were: (1) the control of development along Florida's fragile
coastline, (2) the encouragement of compact urban development rather than urban sprawl development, and (3) the
mandate that development should only take place when adequate infrastructure is in place, a concept which later became
known as concurrency.9 7 To accomplish these goals, all levels
of governments within the state were asked to cooperate and
coordinate their land use regulatory efforts. This combined
effort necessarily required local governments to yield some of
98
their local autonomy in the planning process.
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 380 (Harrison 1988).
93. Id. ch. 163.
94. Id. § 163.3161(1).
95. Id. §§ 161.52-.58.
96. Recording of the House Debate on H. 287, The Growth Management Act
of 1985 (May 14, 1985) [hereinafter Recording, H. 287] (recording available
from the Florida State Archives).
97. See THE NEW FRoNTIER, supra note 56, at 14.

98. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
erosion of "home rule" under a growth management system.
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a. Environmental Land and Water Management
Act 9 9

The Environmental Land and Water Management Act
amendments concentrated primarily on the DRI program
which subjected certain large developments to an extensive
review process and the subsequent imposition of impact
fees. 100 The bill mandated the creation of statewide guidelines and standards to provide a consistent and coherent process for determining whether or not a particular development
should undergo DRI review. 10 ' Triggering thresholds and rebuttable presumptions were created to direct the application
10 2
of those guidelines and standards.
Prior to 1985, developers were entitled to obtain a bindletter
from the Department of Community Affairs (DCA)
ing
indicating whether or not a proposed development was a
DRI.L0 3 However, many developers who had been issued
such a binding letter frequently did not commence development for years, if at all. Consequently, a developer could rely
on that letter years later, even though surrounding conditions may have changed considerably. Although binding letters were still available to developers after the 1985
legislation, a provision was added providing for their expiration if "substantial development" had not taken place within
10 4
three years of the date of issuance.
The Environmental Land and Water Management Act
contains several other significant changes. One such change
is the establishment of the "conceptual agency review" process, the purpose of which was to improve coordination between the DRI process and various other permitting
99. FI-A. STAT ANN. ch. 380 (Harrison 1988).
100. See id. § 380.06. See infra note 106.
101. See id.§ 380.06(2).
102. See id. § 380.06(2)(d). Developments below 80% of all numerical thresholds established by guidelines and standards do not have to undergo DRI review. A development that is at or above 120% of any established numerical
threshold is required to undergo DRI review. See id. The numerical thresholds
are based on guidelines and standards recommended by the DCA which are
used to characterize the development. See id. § 380.06(2)(a),(b).
103. See id. § 380.06(4).
104. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(4)(g) (West 1988).
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requirements for development proposals.' 0 5 The amended
Act also allows credits against local impact fees' 0 6 to avoid
"double impact fees" when a developer is required to contribute funds to a public facility.'07 Upon request by the local
government and certification by the Administration Commission,"08 the DRI review may be transferred to local
governments. 0 9
Another ELWMA provision created the Florida Quality
Developments program, which was designed to encourage
carefully planned development by considering the costs to local government of infrastructure improvements, the protection of Florida's natural resources, and the quality of life of
local residents." 0 Designation of a proposed development
under the new program was conditioned on several requirements including donating fees for the protection of certain
natural resources such as wetlands, or entering into a binding agreement to set aside property for open space."' As an
incentive, a development was exempted from the DRI review
process upon designation." 2
b. Local Government and Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation
Act:" 3
Although local governments were required under the
14
original act to adopt and implement comprehensive plans,"
105. See id. § 380.06(9).
106. Impact fees are payments required of developers by local governments
to offset any adverse impacts of the developer's project. The goal of imposing
impact fees is to internalize the costs of a development as much as possible.
107. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(16)(a),(b) (West 1988).
108. The Administration Commission is composed of the Governor and the
Cabinet. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3164(1) (West 1988).
109. See id § 380.065.
110. See id. § 380.061.
111. See id § 380.061(3)(a)(1)(a).

112. See id § 380.061(5)(b).
113. FA. STAT. ANN.ch. 163.
114. See id. § 163.3167(1). To meet the requirements of the original act, specific elements were required to be included in the comprehensive plans. The bill
added several required elements such as a capital improvements element to
encourage efficient utilization of public facilities. Other elements were made
more specific. For example, as part of the conservation element local govern-
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there was no mechanism in place forcing local governments
to do so. 11 5 A comprehensive plan is a strategy which guides
future local development, consisting of various written and
graphic materials, and includes certain required and optional
elements such as traffic flow, local economy, and coastal management. 116 The amendments established a schedule for lo-

cal governments to prepare and submit its comprehensive
plans to both the appropriate regional planning agency"

and the DCA for

approval."18

7

If the DCA determined that a

plan was not in compliance, DCA was authorized to return

the plan to the local body with objections and recommendations to bring the plan into compliance."19 The State was also
given authority to withhold funds for infrastructure improvements from any local government refusing to bring its plan
20
into compliance.'
At the heart of the comprehensive plan program was the
requirement that plans be both internally and externally consistent on several levels. 12 ' Internal consistency requires
22
that all elements of the plan be consistent with each other,
while external consistency requires the plan to be consistent
with both the state comprehensive plan and the appropriate
ments were required to assess current and future water needs and identify and
depict resources such as wetlands, rivers and beaches on their land use maps.
See id. § 163.3177.
115. See supra notes 72 and 78 and accompanying text.
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3164(4), .3177, .3178 (West 1988). See also
infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text for an explanation of the consistency
requirements.
117. One of the functions of the regional planning agencies was to develop
regional plans consistent with the state comprehensive plan. See Fi. STAT.
ANN. § 186.508 (West 1988). Regional planning agencies help to bridge the gap
between the DCA at the state level and planning agencies at the local level. See
infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
118. See Fi. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3167(2),(3), .3184 (West 1988). The deadlines established in the 1985 bill were extended in 1987, which scheduled the
last local plan to be submitted by July 1, 1991. See Boggs, supra note 64, at
n.33. Interestingly, where a local government refused to develop a plan, the
appropriate regional planning agency was authorized to do so. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.3167 (West 1988).
119. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3184(6) (West 1988).
120. See id. § 163.3184(8).
121. See id. § 163.3177(9).
122. See id.
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123
regional plan developed by the regional planning agency.
This continued consistency was insured by statutory provisions requiring regional and local plans to be reviewed and, if
necessary, revised every five years. 124
Although not explicitly mentioned, the concept of concurrency was also introduced by the 1985 legislation. 125 Concurrency requires that "all public facilities and services needed
to support a development are in place when needed by that
development." 126 The concept developed from two requirements in the 1985 legislation. First, local comprehensive
plans were required to contain a capital improvements element, 27 and second, that element was required to be enforced. 12 8 It is interesting to note that what later became one
of the most controversial provisions of the Florida Growth
Management Act did not raise an eyebrow during the House
129
floor debate.

c.

Coastal Protection

The debate over coastal protection under the Growth
Management bill foreshadowed much of the controversy existing today regarding property rights.13 0 Prior to 1985, in an
effort to control development along Florida's fragile coast, the
state established coastal construction control lines, seaward
of which construction was strictly regulated.' 3 ' The Growth
Management bill required those control lines to be reviewed
and updated if necessary.' 3 2 Furthermore, the DCA was required to establish thirty year erosion projection lines beyond
123. See

FA. STAT. ANN.

§ 163.3177(9) (West 1988).

124. See id. §§ 186.511, 163.3191.
125. See Boggs, supra note 64, at 6.
126. GROWTH MANAGEMENT 2000, supra note 59, at 30.
127. See FL. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(3)(a)(2) (West 1988).
128. See id. § 163.3202(1) (requiring each local government to develop regulations to implement the comprehensive plan).
129. See Recording, H. 287, supra note 96.
130. See id.
131. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.053(2) (West 1988).
132. See id § 161.053(3).
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which only single family dwellings were permitted and then,
133
only if certain conditions were met.
During the House floor debate, some concern was expressed over whether compensation would be provided to
those landowners who would be prohibited from developing
their land on the seaward side of the thirty year erosion
line.1 34 Proponents of the bill admitted that there were no
specific provisions dealing with those situations; however,
they believed existing land acquisition programs were sufficiently adequate to ameliorate any harsh consequences resulting from the new requirements. 13
Apart from this one area of contention, the debate in the
House went smoothly. On May 14th, 1985, the House approved the Growth Management Act by a vote of 109 to 9 and
certified it to the Senate. 3 6 Ten days later, the Senate
13 7
passed the bill as amended and sent it back to the House.
The final version overwhelmingly passed both in the House
by a vote of 112 to 4, and in the Senate, by a vote of 27 to 0.
The Act was ultimately approved by the Governor on the last
38
day of May.'
3. The Growth Management Act in action
By 1986, the population of Florida had reached 12 million, with more than 1,000 people arriving daily. 3 9 Accordingly, and recognizing that development pressures were not
the same everywhere, the DCA established a four year schedule for local governments to submit its local plans for approval.' 40 Between 1988 and 1992, all local governments
133. See id. § 161.053(6). The new provision prohibited the thirty year erosion projection line from being landward of the coastal construction control line.
See id. § 161.053(6)(b).
134. See Recording, H. 287, supra note 96.

135. See id.
136. See H 287, Florida Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1985 History of House Bills
41.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Jon Nordheimer, Florida,BattlingHistory,Tries to Rein in Growth,
N.Y. Tmnis, July 15, 1986, at A22.
140. See THE NEW FRONER, supra note 56, at 15.
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were required to submit a comprehensive plan for approval. 141 However, as submittal dates for the first counties
loomed, the enormous challenge ahead became apparent.1 42
Issues relating to the "levels of service" and concurrency were
the hardest to manage as they threatened to create self-imposed moratoria on development. 43 However, the consequences of not submitting plans on time proved to be severe
as well. The state reduced funding to three small communities when they refused to submit their plans on schedule. 144
Initially, about half the plans submitted were not in compliance. 145 As of 1992, 302 local plans out of a possible 457 were
in compliance, and another forty-three were almost in
compliance. 146

Concurrency was probably the hardest issue to resolve at
the local level because of the fear of moratoria. 147 In 1986,
the Legislature recognized the power of the concept of concurrency, and decided to formally introduce the term into the
language of the statute. 148 Faced with citizen revolt over increased taxes, many local governments viewed the imposition
of impact fees on developers, to be used for funding infrastructure improvements, as the best course of action. 149
141. See id.
142. See John Koenig, The Hidden Cost of Controlling Growth, FLORIDA
TREND, Apr. 25, 1988, at 30.
143. See id.
144. See Michael Bane & Joe O'Neill, Will We Get There From Here? FLORIDA
BusINEss, Dec. 1989, at 14. The three communities were Pembrooke Park, Virginia Gardens, and Creek Village, which lost $83,255, $54,817, and $1,455 respectively in state funding. See id.
145. See THE NEw FRONTimR, supra note 56, at 15.
146. See id.
147. For example, in 1989, local county commissions in Pinellas County and
Hillsborough were forced to impose temporary moratoria on development along
some of their major highways because existing roads were unable to deal with
existing levels of traffic. See Bane, supra note 144, at 14.
148. See Boggs, supra note 64, at 7. The language was amended as follows:
"it is the intent of the legislature that the public facilities and services needed
to support development shall be available concurrent with the impacts of such
development." FIA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(10)(h) (West 1988).
149. See Koenig, supra note 142, at 30. Impact fees can add anywhere from
$3,700 to $6,000 per 1,000 square feet of office space in some cases and up to
$3,000 to the price of a house valued at $100,000. See Bane, supra note 144, at
14.
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Two of the primary state goals of the growth management system are concurrency and compact urban development. 50 Yet, as the bill began to be implemented, situations
arose where the concurrency requirement actually frustrated
the goal of compact urban development.' 51 In many areas,
local governments were forced to either impose temporary
moratoria or severely restrict development in and around urban areas. 152 As a result, concurrency actually promoted urban sprawl rather than compact urban development, since
development was now forced to "leapfrog" into rural areas
where adequate infrastructure already existed.' 53 In response, the DCA introduced flexibility into the concurrency
process by encouraging local governments to develop compact
54
development patterns.
Insufficient funding fueled many of the problems arising
out of the concurrency requirement. Over the years, the state
government fell well short of its responsibility in funding local government efforts. 55 In turn, local governments increased taxes and imposed further impact fees on
developers.' 56 However, one bright spot relating to funding
at the state level has been in the area of land acquisition of
157
fragile habitat areas.
Between 1985 and 1990, due to an unhelpful administration, state agencies failed to properly integrate their func150. See Tim NEW FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 15.
151. See Bane, supra note 144, at 14.
152. This was usually due to inadequate road infrastructure. See id.
153. See id. However, many of the concurrency shortfalls were not at the
local level but on state and county roads. See Boggs, supra note 64, at 11.
154. See THE NEw FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 15.
155. See id. at 23.
156. See id. at 24. At the local level, some counties imposed sales tax increases; others refused. One report put the state's infrastructure deficit at
$52.9 billion. See Bane, supra note 144, at 14.
157. See THE NEw FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 25. Since 1970, Florida has
spent more than $2 billion on the acquisition of environmentally sensitive land.
See Meanwhile, in Florida,Laws, Not Extremists, Help, PAWer BEACH PosT,Apr.
22, 1995, at 2A. During the 1990s, over $4 billion is expected to be spent on
vulnerable lands though various government programs, the Preservation 2000
program being the most prominent one today. See TaE NEW FRoNTrER, supra
note 56, at 25.
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tions in order to promote growth management. 5 8 However,
under the direction of the Chiles Administration, agency policies and functions have become more integrated. 159 In 1991,
Governor Chiles established the third Environmental Land
Management Study Committee (ELMS III) to assess the
growth management system and make recommendations to
the Legislature by December, 1992.160 The 1992 Legislature
was unwilling to wait for these recommendations, however,
and introduced several bills which were aimed at weakening
rather than strengthening the existing system. 161
The 1993 Legislature was quite active in the area of
growth management. 162 Mainly responding to the recommendations of ELMS III, they enacted three laws: (1) the
1993 Planning and Growth Management Act, (2) the 1993
Florida Environmental Reorganization Act, and (3) the 1993
Florida Job Siting Act.' 68 Areas addressed by the 1993 Planning and Growth Management Act included intergovernmental

coordination,

concurrency, 166

64

regional

planning

councils, 1 6 5

state and local comprehensive plans,' 67 and

158. See Tim Naw FRoN'mr_, supra note 56, at 26.
159. See id. at 27. The focus has been on seven state agencies: Community
Affairs; Environmental Regulation; Transportation; Natural Resources; Labor
and Employment; Commerce; and the Game and Freshwater Fish Commission.
See id.
160. See id. at 28.
161. See Tm NEW FRONTIER, supra note 56, at 28. Bills were introduced to
attempt to weaken the consistency requirement, to prevent the DCA from considering cumulative environmental effects of agency permitting, and to "sunset"
the regional planning councils in 1993 unless re-authorized. The last was the
only bill to pass and become law. One promising bill was also enacted which
fine-tuned several parts of the system including the encouragement of innovative planning. See id.

162. See John K DeGrove, State and Regional PlanningActivity: The Florida Experience and Lessons for Other Jurisdictions,930 ALI-ABA 397 (1994)
(hereinafter DeGrove, State and Regional Planning].
163. See id. at 400-01.
164. Generally regarded as the weak point in the growth management system, the act made procedural changes to increase intergovernmental coordination. See id. at 405.
165. Regional planning councils, which came under attack in 1992, were

reestablished with their roles somewhat redefined. See id. at 406.
166. Concurrency requirements were extended to additional public facilities.
Exceptions from the transportation requirements were allowed under certain
circumstances. See id. at 415.
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land acquisition.' 6 The 1993 Florida Environmental Reorganization Act streamlined permitting processes and merged
the Department of Natural Resources and the Department of
Environmental Regulation into the Department of Environmental Protection. 169 Finally, the 1993 Florida Job Siting
Act integrated economic development policies and environmental protection policies. 17o
To summarize, Florida's growth management system
represents a tremendous commitment by all levels of government, by property owners and the general public to deal with
the State's growth problems.' 7 ' It mandates that development only take place when adequate supporting facilities and
infrastructure are in place. It seeks a balance between allowing development and protecting the environment. It requires state and local governments to form a partnership and
plan consistently with one another. Consequently, growth
management represents an erosion of traditional local government home rule.172 "Home rule" advocates, who believe
decisions which affect local communities "are best handled lo167. The legislation expanded the focus of the State Comprehensive Plan to
include areas such as public health and safety, community redevelopment, and
historic preservation. Local Plan provisions were amended to reduce pre-compliance review periods. See DeGrove, State and RegionalPlanning,supra note
162, at 410-13.
168. See id. at 400.
169. See id. at 420-22.
170. See id. at 422.
171. For an complete overview of the chronological development of growth
management in Florida see GROWTH MANAGEmENT 2000, supra note 59, at 6973.
172. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of
State-Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. Ray. 497 (1993). Since
the decision in Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), when
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of local zoning, courts have deferred to local legislative judgement as long as it is "fairly debatable" that the
regulation advances a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 388. See also
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 56 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Home rule has long been considered an essential ingredient of individual rights because it places government as close as possible to the citizens.
Growth management necessarily has required a sacrifice of some of that local
autonomy. For an understanding of the role of home rule in the political structure, see Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay On Pluralism, 64 WASH. L.
REv. 51 (1989); George D. Vaubel, Toward Principlesof State Restraint Upon
the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REv. 5 (1990).
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cally and without state interference," would disagree with
this shift in authority. 173 Yet, by 1985, the pressures in Florida were such that the state, in order to maintain the quality
of life for its citizens, could no longer allow local governments
to go their own way without considering conditions beyond
their political boundaries. Florida's growth management system is reminiscent of Leopold's 'community of interdependent
parts' with the land as the thread which links those parts
together. 174

As the amendments over time suggest, growth management is a process that requires constant revision in the face
of unforeseen problems and changing circumstances. 7 5
Growth management in Florida is a complex system which
took decades to create. Through regulations used to implement planning policies, it requires individual landowners to
forego many opportunities they might have otherwise had.
However, one important question remains: who should pay
for these lost opportunities?
III. Property Rights in Florida
The birth of the modern property rights movement can
be traced back to the early 1980s when dissatisfaction among
rural landowners in western states resulted in a rebellion
prompted by the federal government's management of public
land.'7 6 Followers of what became known as the Sagebrush
Rebellion had one simple solution to what they viewed as federal incompetence and mismanagement of public lands: turn
title to those lands over to the states, thereby giving control of
the lands to a body closer to local citizens. 177 The rebels were
173. See Nolon, supra note 172, at 505.
174. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
176. See Foster, supra note 6, at 1. See Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the
Environment: An IntergovernmentalPerspective of the SagebrushRebellion, 12
ENvTL. L. 847 (1982). The rebels were not merely made up of small rural landowners. It has been suggested that much of the funding for the Rebellion came
from corporate pockets. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Anti-Environmental 'Wise
Use' Movement in America, LAND USE L. 3, 4, Feb. 1995.
177. See Babbitt, supra note 176, at 848.
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supported by a sympathetic Reagan Administration; 178 however, the movement was disorganized and made little
progress. 179
In recent years, the property rights movement, renamed
the Wise Use movement, has become more organized, gaining
nationwide support. 180 In the wake of a world wide economic
recession, Wise Users focus their attack on environmental
laws and regulations alleging that these laws destroy jobs
and are too costly to local economies.' 8 ' Moreover, local Wise
Use organizations feel that the current takings law provides
inadequate protection for landowners burdened by regulation. These organizations lead the charge in the present
spate of "compensation" bills at the state level.182
Since 1990, all fifty state legislatures have considered
some form of property rights legislation, with eighteen states
enacting bills. 83 These bills vary greatly as to their requirements. At one end of the spectrum is legislation requiring
government agencies to engage in takings impact analysis
before promulgating regulations; other bills either require
compensation to be paid when a landowner's property is affected by regulations (under certain circumstances only) or
place a landowner beyond the reach of regulations that would
178. See id. at 847.
179. See Jacobs, supra note 176, at 4.
180. See id. Jacobs suggests that while many of the same corporate backers
who supported the Sagebrush Rebellion are now supporting the Wise Use
movement, it would be a mistake to compare the two. Wise Use followers are
highly organized and have spread their wings to all fifty states with an expanded agenda. Id.
181. See id. at 3. See also Adam Pertman, Wise Use EndangersNation's EnvironmentalRules, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER, Nov. 21, 1994, at A10. Wise Use
claims that environmental regulations hurt jobs and the economy are not supported by recent studies which suggest the opposite. See Ronald Smothers,
Study FindsEnvironmental and Economic Health Compatible,N.Y. TosS, Oct.
19, 1994, at A18; David J. Russ, How the 'PropertyRights' Movement Threatens
Property Values in Florida,9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, n. 77-87 and accompanying text (1994) (discussing evidence that shows Florida's growth management system has had a positive rather than a negative impact on the economy);

Daniel Glick, Having Owls and Jobs Too, NATIONAL

WDLIFE, Aug.-Sept.

1995,

at 8 (describing a booming economy in Oregon where anti-environmentalists
claimed protection of the spotted owl would destroy jobs).
182. Jacobs, supra note 176, at 3.
183. See Peirce, supra note 6, at 13A.
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reduce the value of his land by a certain percentage.'1

4

It is

interesting to note, however, that when similar measures
were submitted directly to voters recently, those measures
were firmly defeated.' 8 5
A. Takings Case Law in Florida
Modern takings jurisprudence can be traced to Justice
186
Holmes' announcement in PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon
that the general rule under the Fifth Amendment' 8 7 is that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 8 8 However, courts have struggled over the precise meaning of that
language and have invariably declined to declare a "set
formula" for takings analysis, relying instead on an ad hoc
factual inquiry.' 8 9 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 190 the Supreme Court announced a three
pronged balancing test to determine if a taking occurred.' 9 '
The court weighed (1) the economic impact of the regulation,
(2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations of the property owner,
and (3) the character of the governmental action. 92 How184. See Jonathan E. Rinde, 'Take Me, Take Me' Can There Be A Property
Rights Bill That Environmentalists Can Support?, PENNSYLVANA L. WKLY.,
Aug. 14, 1995, at S6; See Foster, supra note 6, at 1; See Peirce, supra note 6, at
13A. Texas passed a bill that would allow landowners to be exempt from any
regulation that reduces the value of their land by more than 25 percent. See id
185. See Property Rights -And Wrongs, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan.
3, 1996, at AS. Voters in the States of Washington and Arizona turned down
property rights measures by a margin of 60-40 percent. See id.
186. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The relevant clause reads: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
188. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
189. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992) (citations omitted).
190. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
191. See id. at 124.
192. See id. In Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),
the Supreme Court held that there must also be an "essential nexus" between
the effect of the regulation and the public interest being served. Id. at 837. The
Court expanded on this requirement somewhat in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994), when it held that exactions imposed on property owners as
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ever, the Court took a more categorical approach in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 93 declaring that a taking
occurs when a regulation deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of his property' 94 unless the regulation prohibits a use that offends the
background principles of the state's common law.' 9 5

Takings analysis under Florida's Constitution generally
follows federal analysis. The relevant constitutional provision reads: "[n]o private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to
each owner . . "96 As under federal law, there is "no set
formula" for determining if a taking has occurred.' 97 Instead,
courts engage in a factual inquiry to determine whether the
regulation "denies substantially all economically beneficial or
productive use of land."198 Additionally, courts are required
to look to the property as a whole rather than only the portion
specifically affected by the regulation. 199 Finally, Florida
now follows federal law200 in that, under certain circumstances, a temporary taking can occur which will require
compensation. 20 '
conditions on development approval must be "roughly proportional" to the impact of the proposed development. See id.
193. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
194. See id. at 2893. This categorical approach is reminiscent of the test announced inAgins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), where the Court held

that a taking occurs when a regulation does not advance a legitimate state interest or denies an owner of all economically viable use of his land. 447 U.S. at
260. Furthermore, the court in Lucas did not overturn the Penn Central decision suggesting that either test may be used depending upon the circumstances
presented by the case.
195. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
196. FL.A CONST., art. X, § 6(a) (1968).
197. Vatalaro v. Dept. of Envtl. Regulation, 601 So.2d 1223, 1227 (Fla. 1992).
198. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640
So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994).
199. See Department of Envtl. Regulation v. MacKay, 544 So.2d 1065, 1066
(Fla.3d DCA 1989). But see David K. Thulman, Takings Law in Florida: The
Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 595
(1993) (suggesting that while Florida courts continue to look to the entire property, the Lucas footnotes have thrown some doubt on that approach).
200. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
201. See Tampa-Hillsborough County, 640 So.2d at 58.
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B. Property Rights Action Before the 1995 Legislation
The issue of property rights is not new to Florida. In the
mid-1970s, both the Legislature and the Administration established panels to study the issue. 20 2 Eventually, in 1978,
their recommendations resulted in legislation passing which
set forth "remedies available to property owners 'substantially affected by a final action of any agency with respect to a
permit.'" 203 However, this legislation failed to resolve the uncertainty that has plagued this area.20 4
In the early 1990s, the Florida property rights debate
emerged again. In 1993, the Legislature passed a bill which
required the appropriate agency, when one of its regulations
reduces the value of a parcel of land by more than forty percent, to either compensate the landowner or exclude that
landowner from the regulation. 20 5 Governor Chiles vetoed
that bill.206 However, in an effort to appease property rights

advocates, he established the Governor's Property Rights
Study Commission II which was charged with assessing the
property rights issue. 207
The following year, the property rights campaign continued with the introduction of several bills.208 Two of the most
prominent bills, H. 485 and S. 630, mirrored the 1993 effort,
requiring compensation or recision of the regulation (as applied) where the property's value was reduced by more than
forty percent. 20 9 Property rights advocates wanted to stop
what they viewed as a "runaway regulatory bureaucracy."210
202. See Kent Wetherell, PrivatePropertyRights Legislation: The Midnight
Version and Beyond, 22 FI. ST.U. L. REV. 525, 538 (1994). Those panels were
known as the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission and the Senate
Select Committee on Property Rights and Land Acquisition. See id.
203. Id. at 538 (citing 1978 Fla. Laws chs. 78-85).
204. See id. at 543.
205. See id. at 544.
206. See Wetherell, supra note 202, at 544.
207. See David L. Powell et al., Florida'sNew Law to ProtectPropertyRights,
69-Oct. FLA B.J. 12 (1995).
208. See The Neighborhood Safety & Health Association, Seizing the Middle
Ground: The Defeat of Florida's 1994 'Takings' Legislation, Sec. A.
209. See id.
210. Id. at sec. B (reprinting article by Booth Gunter, Backlash, Dec. 12,
1993).
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Other landowners saw excessive government regulation as a
"trend toward a socialist society where government interest
takes precedence over private interest."2 11 However, through

the efforts of a broad based coalition of groups known as the
2 12
Neighborhood Safety and Health Association (NSHA),
213
these bills never went before the Legislature for a vote.
Also in 1994, the Tax Cap Committee, perhaps the most
prominent property rights group in Florida, launched a petition for a constitutional amendment. 214 This amendment
was eventually removed from the ballot by Florida's Supreme
Court.215

C.

The Property Rights Act of 1995

1995 continued where 1994 left off with property rights
at the forefront of the political agenda. Faced with another
drive for a constitutional amendment, 216 Governor Chiles
brought environmentalists and property rights advocates together to create a compromise bill.217 On May 2, 1995, after
211. Victor Hull, Fencing in Landowners, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Feb.
5, 1994.
212. See The Neighborhood Safety & Health Association, supra note 208, at
Sec. A. The coalition included 1000 Friends of Florida, The Nature Conservancy, the Florida League of Women Voters, the Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association, the Florida League of Cities, the Florida Consumer
Action Network, the Florida Public Interest Research Group, the Florida Association of Counties, the Florida Sierra Club, and the Florida Audobon Society.
A compromise bill based on the recommendations of the Governors Property
Rights Study Commission also died when provisions were added that would
fund the bill from a parkland acquisition program. See id.
213. See Russ, supra note 181, at n.111 and accompanying text.
214. See id. at n.11. The Tax Cap Committee claims to be a grass roots organization which has two main goals; to increase property rights and reduce
taxes. See Tax Cap Committee, supra note 15. Yet most of the funding for the
Tax Cap Committee comes from large corporations. For example, in 1994, the
U.S. Sugar Corp. contributed over $1.6 million to the Committee whose total
contributions for that year came to over $3.4 million (from materials prepared
by 1000 Friends of Florida based on the Tax Cap Committee's tax return).
215. See Powell, supra note 207, at 12. The petition had gathered over
800,000 signatures to put the issue on the ballot. However, the state Supreme
Court removed the proposed amendment from the ballot stating that it was
improperly written. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 8A.
216. See The PropertyAppeasers, supra note 15, at 2D.
217. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 1A, 8A; The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,
supra note 4, at IA.
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several technical amendments were added, the compromise
bill, H. 863, went before the House and passed by a vote of
111 to 0.218 The next day, the Senate voted on the bill and
passed it by a vote of 38 to 1.219 On May 18, 1995, the Governor signed H. 863220 into law. 221
H. 863 created two separate acts. 2 22 First, the Bert J.

Harris Private Property Rights Protection Act creates a new
cause of action for landowners seeking compensation when a

regulation inordinately burdens their land.2 23 Second, the

Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act
allows a property owner, who believes that a governmental
action unreasonably or unfairly burdens the use of his land,
to ask for an informal dispute resolution before a special
master. 224
1.

The Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights
Protection Act

The Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Protection
Act (Property Rights Act), which became effective on October
1, 1995, provides a new cause of action entitling landowners
to relief when an action by a governmental entity225 "has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a
vested right to a specific use of real property."226 Three questions immediately emerge from this language.227 When does
218. H 863, Florida Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1995 History of House Bills 268.
219. See id. The bill's easy passage may be somewhat deceiving. Sen. Rick
Dantzler said of the measure, "I think we have to do something this year or we

are going to be facing a constitutional amendment in 1996." He went on to say:
"If we do this the wrong way, we will change forever the face of Florida." Vickie

Chachere, Proposal Would Aid Landowners; Property Rights Bill Seeks Common Ground, TAMPA TmiBUNE, Apr. 10, 1995, at 1.
220. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 70.001-.80 (West Supp. 1996).
221. H 863, Florida Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1995 History of House Bills 268.
222. See FiA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001-.80 (West Supp. 1996).
223. See id. § 70.001.
224. See id. § 70.51.

225. A government entity includes state, regional or local government agencies. See id. § 70.001(3)(c).
226. FLA.. STAT. ANN.§ 70.001(2) (West Supp. 1996).
227. See Tom Pelham, Coping with the New Property Rights Act, GROWTH
MANAGEmENT REP., Fall 1995 [hereinafter Pelham, Coping].
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an inordinate burden occur? What is an existing use? What
is a vested use?
An inordinate burden occurs when:
an action of one or more governmental entities [which] has
restricted or limited the use of real property such that the
property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing
use of the real property
or a vested right to a specific use of
228
the real property.
Following established takings case law, the property
must be taken as a whole. 2 29 Furthermore, an inordinate

burden does not include any temporary impacts on property
20
or any government action relating to a public nuisance.
Thus, the definition is reminiscent of the language used by
courts engaging in takings analysis; 23 1 however, the Act expressly provides that an inordinate burden occurs without
rising "to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or
the United States Constitution."23 2 It may take years before
a clear picture emerges of what constitutes an inordinate burden but courts have received a clear message from the Legislature that an inordinate burden arises before a
constitutional taking occurs.
The term "existing use" is:
an actual, present use or activity on the real property...
or such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses
which are suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an
existing fair market value in the property greater than the
fair market value233
of the actual, present use or activity on
the real property.
228. Fi-a

STAT. ANN.

§ 70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 1996).

229. See 1d.

230. See i.

231. See supra part M. A.
232. FLA.STAT. ANN. § 70.001(9) (West Supp. 1996).
233. Id. § 70.001(3)(b).
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Interestingly, this controversial section was amended the
day before the bill was passed. 2 34 The definition explicitly
states that the reasonably foreseeable use must be nonspeculative; however, the rest of the language is so broad that
it begs the inclusion of speculative uses when the court determines the scope of coverage. 23 5
Finally, a vested right is determined by established principles of "equitable estoppel or substantive due process under
the common law or ... [state] statutory law."2 36 While the
common law regarding a vested right under equitable estoppel is fairly clear in Florida, it is less so for substantive due
process.2 3 7 Further, the Property Rights Act now allows a
landowner to be compensated under equitable estoppel which
previously provided only injunctive remedies. 2 38
This Act can only operate prospectively in that a cause of
action may only arise under any law enacted after May 12,
1995.239 Therefore, any existing laws, including those relating to growth management, are exempted. However, any existing law, rule or regulation amended after that date gives
rise to a cause of action to the extent that the amended por240
tion inordinately burdens the property.
Procedurally, the landowner is required to notify the government entity involved in writing of his claim 180 days prior
to filing suit.2 4 1 During this period, the governmental entity
is required to respond with a written settlement offer which
may include:
234. See Tom Pelham, Florida Legislature Enacts Private Property Rights
ProtectionsAct, FLORIDA PLANNING, May/June 1995 [hereinafter Pelham, Florida Legislature]. The amendment expanded the definition of existing use to include "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for
the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which
have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair
market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property." FLA.

70.001(3)(b) (West Supp. 1996).
235. See Pelham, FloridaLegislature, supra note 234.
236. FLa. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996).

STAT. ANN. §

237.238.
239.
240.
241.

See
See
See
See
See

Pelham, Coping, supra note 227, at 4.
id.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.001(12) (West Supp. 1996).
id.
id. § 70.001(4)(a).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/18

36

1996]

CHANGNG POLITICAL CLIMATE

305

(1) An adjustment of land development or permit standards or other provisions controlling the development
or use of land.
(2) Increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or
use of areas of development.
(3) The transfer of developmental rights.
(4) Land swaps or exchanges.
(5) Mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite
mitigation.
(6) Location on the least sensitive portion of the property.
(7) Conditioning the amount of development or use
permitted.
(8) A requirement that issues be addressed on a more
comprehensive basis than a single proposed use or
development.
(9) Issuance of the development order, a variance, special
exception, or other extraordinary relief.
(10) Purchase of the real property, or an interest therein,
by an appropriate governmental entity.
2 42
(11) No changes to the action of the governmental entity.
If the landowner decides to accept the offer, it may be
implemented through an appropriate development agreement by issuing a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief; or by another appropriate method.243
However, the relief granted under the settlement offer must
protect the public interest and may only be used to the extent
244
that it removes the inordinate burden from the landowner.
If the settlement offer is not accepted, the government
entity must issue a written ripeness decision specifying allowable uses for the property.2 4 5 Upon expiration of the 180
day notice period, the landowner is free to file suit seeking
compensation in circuit court.2 46 Compensation is to be determined by calculating the difference in fair market value
2 47
before and after the imposition of the law or regulation.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. § 70.001(4)(c) (emphasis added).
See Fia. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(c) (West Supp. 1996).
See id. § 70.001(4)(d).
See id. § 70.001(5)(a).
See id. § 70.001(5)(b).
See FL& STAT. ANN. § 70.001(6)(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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Finally, the prevailing party is entitled to recover "reasonable
costs and attorney fees."248
2. The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute
Resolution Act
The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Reso-

lution Act (Dispute Resolution Act)2 49 is based on the recom-

mendations of the Governor's Private Property Rights Study
Commission II.250 It creates a mediation proceeding overseen
by a special master 251 for any landowner "who believes that a
development order... or an enforcement action of a governmental entity, is unreasonableor unfairly burdens the use of
his real property."252 Unlike the Property Rights Act, the application of the Dispute Resolution Act is not restricted to
prospective governmental actions. However, the landowner
is required to exhaust all "nonjudicial local government administrative appeals" which do not take longer than four
months before requesting a "special master proceeding. 253
The special master must hold a hearing within forty-five
days from the request for relief.254 The purpose of the hearing is to "focus attention on the impact of the governmental
action.., and to explore alternatives to the development order or enforcement action and other regulatory efforts by the
governmental entities in order to recommend relief, when appropriate, to the owner."255 If the hearing does not produce a
resolution, the special master is required to produce a written
recommendation regarding the dispute within fourteen days
after the hearing.256
If the special master finds that the government action is
unreasonable or it unfairly burdens the owner, the governmental entity must either accept, modify, or reject the recom248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. § 70.001(6)(c).
Id § 70.51.
See Pelham, FloridaLegislature, supra note 234.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.51(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996).
Id. § 70.51(3) (emphasis added).
Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
See id. § 70.51(15)(a).
FL.A. STAT. ANN. § 70.51(17) (West Supp. 1996).
See id. § 70.51(19).
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mendation. 25 7 The special master must recommend that the
government action remain undisturbed if he determines it to
be reasonable without unfairly burdening the owner.258 Regardless of the special master's recommendation, the owner
may file suit against the government entity once the government entity has acted on the special master's recommendation. 259 Finally, an owner is not required to go through the
dispute resolution process before filing a civil suit.2 60 Thus,
nothing in the Dispute Resolution Act prevents a property
owner from pursuing a remedy under the Property Rights Act
261
at the outset.
To restate, Florida's growth management seeks to preserve the quality of life for all individuals, present and future.
Supporters of growth management recognize the worth of
certain resources such as open space and a diverse ecosystem
as part of a healthy "community" even though the value of
these resources cannot be easily quantified. The success of
growth management rests on three foundations. First, different levels of government must integrate their land use efforts. Second, the growth management system must be
constantly reviewed and changed to embrace new ideas and
changing conditions. Finally, the private landowners must
recognize their ethical obligation to the "broader community"
2
in using their land.

62

257. See id. § 70.51(21). Failure to act within forty-five days is deemed a
rejection. See id. § 70.51(21)(c).
258. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.51(19)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
259. See id. § 70.51(24).
260. See id.
261. See id. § 70.80.
262. Leopold wrote:
a system of conservation based solely on economic self interest is
hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial
value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. Its assumes, falsely, I think, that economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the economic parts. It tends to
relegate government to many fimctions eventually too large, too
complex, or too widely dispersed to be performed by government.
An ethical obligation on the part of the private owner is the only
visible remedy for these situations.
LEOPOLD, supra note 24, at 251 (emphasis added).
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The property rights law seeks to cushion the blow of governmental intrusion into the use of privately owned land.
The legislation was born of compromise between growth management and environmental advocates seeking to ward off
harsher measures, and property rights advocates seeking to
enhance the rights of the individual landowner. While the
exact meaning of an "inordinate burden" is unclear, the legislature has made it clear that the threshold for showing an
inordinate burden is lower than that for a constitutional
taking.
IV. Analysis
Years of implementation and judicial interpretation will
pass before the full impact of the Property Rights Act
emerges. Despite defining such terms as "inordinately burdens," "existing use," and "vested use,"2 63 the law remains

vague and uncertain in many respects. Logically, there are
two possible outcomes. The law may become another "lame
duck" statute, adding little to remedies already available
under a constitutional takings claim. If this occurs, this bill
will do little to appease the appetite of property rights advocates. On the other hand, the measure may turn out to have
some sharp teeth, thereby jeopardizing Florida's entire
growth management system which took decades to build.
Growth management experts disagree over the impact of
the new law. Some are already convinced that the bill
achieves the correct balance on an "emotional issue."2

64

Jim

Murley, a participant in the negotiation process and at the
time, head of the 1000 Friends of Florida,2 65 viewed the bill
as a compromise which is "not going to cause unnecessary
266
damage to environmental or growth [management] laws."

On the other hand, Tom Pelham, former Secretary of the
263. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
264. Powell, supra note 207, at 12.
265. 1000 Friends of Florida is a broad based group that has led growth
management efforts in Florida over the years. See 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORMA,
supra note 52.
266. Cindy Harger, Law ComplicatesPropertyRights, TMA ThBuNE, June
11, 1995, at 1.
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DCA, saw the bill as "a one-sided equation" reflecting "extreme, selfish indifference at the expense of the greater good
of the community."267 Notwithstanding these discordant
views, the Property Rights Act expressly states that the
threshold for finding an inordinate burden is lower than that
for a constitutional takings. 268 This indicates that the new
law will have a measurable effect and, thus, must be analyzed accordingly.
As discussed above, a successful growth management
system has at least three fundamental requirements: (1) an
ongoing review of the system to ensure that it meets current
conditions and reflects current ideas, (2) an acceptance of responsibility to the community by the individual landowner,
and (3) a coordinated, cooperative effort by all levels of government within the state.269 This property rights measure, if
it is to fulfill its mandate, will adversely impact, either directly or indirectly, all three of these foundational bases of
sound growth management.
First, as growth management is a dynamic process,
many state, regional and local laws and regulations must be
amended over time. Once amended, actions under these provisions will be subject to compensation claims under the
Property Rights Act.2 70 However, given the strained finan-

cial resources of governmental agencies today, necessary
changes or actions may simply not be undertaken.
Second, the Property Rights Act operates as a significant
responsibility shifting mechanism. The Act directly shifts responsibility for the preservation of a healthy "community"
from the individual landowner to the general public because
the landowner must be compensated, using public monies,
when a law or regulation inordinately burdens his property.
267. The PropertyAppeasers, supra note 17, at 2D.
268. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 70.001(9) (West Supp. 1996).
269. All three are grounded in the two essential prongs of sustainable development; a general consensus on how to preserve the quality of life and a strategic framework for achieving it. The acceptance of individual responsibility and
involvement in a cooperative effort are elements of a general consensus. Constant review and revision are essential to the strategic framework. See supra
part 11. A.
270. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 70.001(9) (West Supp. 1996).
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In a less tangible, but ultimately more significant way, the
Property Rights Act also shifts responsibility from the present generation to future generations because only laws enacted or amended in the future will be subject to
compensation claims.
Third, the Act has the potential of destroying the common goals and efforts of state and local governments. Action
by the state government may ultimately expose local governments to compensation claims. Additionally, other provisions
in the Property Rights Act allow the state government and
landowners to further erode local government authority over
land use within its jurisdiction.
Finally, the future role of the Dispute Resolution Act also
seems unclear because, even though it is not restricted to prospective laws or regulations, it seems destined to remain in
the shadow of the Property Rights Act. Drafters of the Dispute Resolution Act did not create the law as a support mechanism for the Property Rights Act; however, enacted as part
of a property rights package, the Dispute Resolution Act and
the bureaucracy it creates have little chance of being effective. Each of the concerns raised here are dealt with in more
detail below.
A. The Property Rights Act Obstructs the Dynamic Nature
of Growth Management
While it may be somewhat unclear as to the extent of the
adverse effect the Property Rights Act will have on growth
management in Florida, it seems certain, nonetheless, that
some effect will result. Although the law only applies prospectively, 27 1 there is little doubt that many growth management laws will eventually come under its umbrella. Growth
management is not a static mechanism 272 because, as with
most processes, it faces conditions and influences which are
constantly and, often, unpredictably changing. 273 It is foolish
271. See id. § 70.001(12).
272. See The Property Appeasers, supra note 17, at 2D (referring to comments made by Tom Peliam, former Secretary of the State Department of Community Affairs in Florida).
273. See supra note 18.
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to think that growth management laws as they stand today
constitute the perfect system for dealing with Florida's land
use and development issues of tomorrow. Once amended,
growth management laws are subject to compensation claims
under the new Property Rights Act.27 4 Furthermore, the sys-

tem is such that local governments will bear the initial burden of many of these claims. In a responsive growth
management system, two situations typically arise that necessitate a local government action.
First, any modification to a state or regional plan must
be reflected in local comprehensive plans.2

75

In addition, if

the past is any indication, major changes to the growth management system will be necessary at the state and regional
level if Florida is to preserve its quality of life. Even though
there was a comprehensive overhaul of Florida's growth management framework in 1985, by 1993, extensive changes and
additions were again needed.27 6 For example, in 1993, the
State Comprehensive Plan was amended to include elements
such as community redevelopment and historic preservation. 2 77

However, the consistency requirement mandates

that changes made at the state level be reflected at the regional and local levels as well. 27 8

Furthermore, statutory

provisions require regional and local plans to be reviewed and
revised every five years. 279 Therefore, any changes to the
state comprehensive plan or other laws and regulations
which implement that plan must eventually be incorporated
into a local comprehensive plan.
Second, a change in a local development condition may
also necessitate an amendment to the local zoning ordinance
or comprehensive plan. Assume for example, development
pressures increase around a particular location of historic in274. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(12) (West Supp. 1996).

275. Of course, any modification or addition to the list of required elements
to be included in local comprehensive plans under section 163.3177 of the Florida statute would certainly require a modification of local laws and regulations.
See FA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (West 1988).
276. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
277. See DeGrove, State and Regional Planning,supra note 162, at 410-13.
278. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
279. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.511, 163.3191 (West 1988).
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terest such that the local government considers creating a
historic district to sustain tourism or preserve unique structures within its jurisdiction. 280 To accomplish this, the comprehensive plan or local zoning ordinance may have to be
amended. Further, because internal consistency is required

at the local level as part of the comprehensive plan, 281 elements within the comprehensive plan other than historic
preservation, (or at least the laws and regulations that implement them), may also have to be amended. For example, the
preservation of a local historic district may necessitate an alteration to implementation of the traffic element in a local
comprehensive plan.282 This, in turn, may require zoning

changes extending beyond the historic district itself to control
traffic access to the historic district. If the historic area attracts a significant amount of tourism, the town may not
want any large truck activity nearby and may rezone a
nearby industrial area to light industry. An owner of a parcel
within the rezoned area, or within the historic district for
that matter, may well feel that he or she has been "inordinately burdened" and initiate a claim.
Both of the situations described above subject local government actions to claims under the new law. Where
changes at the local level are made, local governments may
have to impose a tax increase to meet the costs of compensa280. Under the State Comprehensive Plan it is the goal of the state to "increase access to... historical and cultural resources .... " Some of the Plan's
policies to achieve that goal are to:
Ensure that historic resources are taken into consideration in the
planning of all capital programs and projects at all levels of government and that such programs and projects are carried out in a manner which recognizes the preservation of historic resources;
Encourage the rehabilitation and sensitive adaptive use of historic
properties through technical assistance and economic incentive
programs.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 187.201(19) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
281. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
282. See F.A. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(b) (West 1988). This section provides: "the [local] comprehensive plan shall include.. . a traffic circulation element consisting of the types, locations, and extent of existing and proposed
major thoroughfares and transportation routes, including bicycle and pedestrian ways." Id
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tion claims under the Property Rights Act to avoid reducing
funding elsewhere.28 3 Unfortunately, the current political
and economic environment suggests that the public would be
hard pressed to accept any tax increase. Thus, faced with the
mandate that local plans be consistent with state and regional plans, local governments are more likely to meet the
consistency requirement technically but not in the spirit that
growth management requires. The tragedy is that the detrimental effect will be so gradual that it will go largely unnoticed and, therefore, unchecked.
Thus, the Property Rights Act will have a chilling effect
on local government initiatives to preserve the local quality of
28 4
life. There is evidence that this has already taken place.

Officials in Palm Beach County and the City of Deland have
scrapped plans to create regulations to protect open space
near the Everglades and to establish an historic district respectively. 285 With limited financial resources, local governments are likely to avoid making needed changes for fear of
what it might cost. 28 6 Even property rights advocates agree
283. It is interesting to note that the most likely tax increase at the local
level would be a property tax which has never been embraced with open arms.
The fact that courts are directed to apportion the compensation costs according
to responsibility among governmental entities does not negate this point. See
id. § 70.001(6)(b). Litigation costs alone can be extremely high. So, even if the
court determines the state bares the entire responsibility for inordinately burdening the landowner, the litigation costs require the expenditure of much
needed financial resources. The law does, however, allow government entities
to recover costs when they prevail. See id. § 70.001(6)(c).
284. See George Bennett, New Law Foils Plan to Cut AG Reserve Development, PALM BEACH POST, May 25, 1995, at 13; Woitas, supra note 22, at 1; Speculators' Paradise, supra note 22, at 2F; Bill Lambrecht, Florida'sProperty
Rights Law; Born of Fear, Worries Offiials, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 9,
1995, at 6A; Rose, supra note 22, at A8; Robert Perez, Land-Rights Law Worries
Planners,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 1996, at KI; Steve Liewer, Developer to
Petition for Site on Ag Reserve, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 1996, at 3B.
Of course, a chilling effect is exactly what some people want. Scott Butler, staff
attorney for the Florida Farm Bureau put it: "When you say 'a chilling effect,'
that sounds like a negative thing. But for Florida farmers, it's a positive thing."
Jerry Jackson, Property Rights Law 1st Step for Farmers, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 17.
285. See Bennett, supra note 284, at 1B; Rose, supra note 22, at A8.
286. Raising taxes to "finance" new regulations in the current economic climate is unlikely. In fact, as its name suggests, the other major objective of the
Tax Cap Committee is to reduce taxes. See Tax Cap Committee, supra note 15.
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that the bill will have the effect "of enshrining the existing
statutes."287 When needed changes are not acted upon, the
very essence of the growth management process is weakened.
B.

The Property Rights Act has Shifted Responsibility
Towards the Land from the Individual Landowner to
the General Public and from the Present
Generation to Future Generations

All burdens relating to land use are traditionally shared
by the general public and the individual property owner.
Typically, these burdens include restrictions on the land use
and public access to certain areas to preserve the character of
the community and the natural resource involved, or taxes
collected to provide and maintain supporting facilities and infrastructure for the community and for the use of land itself.28 8

The individual property owner's burden can be

justified by the long standing notion that there is a certain
obligation arising out of the ownership of land that extends to
the surrounding community. 28 9 The Property Rights Act
shifts some of that burden (although not all landowners will
benefit from that shift) from individual property owners to
the general public. Simply put, the landowner's commitment
to the broader community is now reduced because the public
will ultimately pay for compensation claims under the new
law. 290
Since the Property Rights Act is prospective in nature, it
essentially breaches the trust between present and future
generations. The concept of sustainable development reminds us that each generation has "both rights and obligations in relation to the environment."2 91 Growth
If the Tax Cap Committee succeeds in meeting both of its objectives, growth
management would be destroyed and it would represent a breach of the commitment by Florida's citizens to future generations.
287. Chachere, supra note 219, at 1.
288. At the local level, taxes usually come in the form of property taxes
aimed at the landowner and sales taxes aimed at the general public.
289. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
290. Even unsuccessful claims will result in significant legal fees for the local
municipality.
291. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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management represents a commitment by the present gener2 92
ation to future generations to preserve the quality of life.
Thus, because of its prospective nature, the law decreases the
overall exposure of environmental and growth management
laws to compensation claims. However, this compromise primarily satisfies the needs of present generations, thereby
placing a heavy burden on those who follow. 293 In this regard, the compromise allows the current growth management
system to remain intact. However, it jeopardizes any further
evolution of the system. This hardly fulfills the present gen294
eration's obligation to future generations.
C. The Property Rights Act Will Potentially Pit State and
Local Governments Against Each Other
Cooperation and coordination are vital to the survival of
a growth management system. To succeed, growth manage-'
ment requires all levels of government to work together to
achieve the shared goals of preserving both the environment
and quality of life. Under the new Property Rights Act, two
possible situations can arise where state and local governments have adverse interests.
First, a conflict may arise between state, regional, and
local governments when the state makes a change to a
growth management law or regulation.295 An amendment to
the State Comprehensive Plan will require amendment at
both the regional and local levels.2

96

In addition, regional

planning agencies are required by statute to review their
292. See supra part II. A. Florida's population may double over the next 25
years. Craig Quintana, Growth Problem Hits Close to Home, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 5, 1994, at Al.
293. In this sense, the law is reminiscent of NJMBY (not in my backyard);
i.e., NIMG (not in my generation).
294. Supporters of the Property Rights Act might argue that the alternative
to this law might be worse. They contend that all growth management laws
may have been subject to compensation claims under the law. The argument
might have some merit had this law appeased property rights advocates. Thus
far, this has not occurred. See also infra part V.
295. See supra part IV. A.
296. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3177, 186.507(1) (West 1988).
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plans every five years for any necessary changes. 297 Thus,
local governments are left with no choice but to amend their
regulations, thereby exposing them to compensation claims.
Who pays? The Property Rights Act contains a provision
which allows a court to determine the relative percentage of
responsibility of each government entity where more than
one is determined to be responsible.298 However, it is not
clear whether this provision would address the situations described above. If it does, then each governmental party will
argue that the others are primarily responsible, and therefore, must pay the lion's share of a compensation claim by a
property owner. If it does not, the local government is left to
pay the full compensation amount for an action it was required to take by the state. Ultimately, each level of government is cast against the other to the detriment of growth
management.
The second situation that could potentially cause hostility between the local and state entities can arise when a state
agency is deemed to be the responsible government entity in
a compensation claim under the Property Rights Act.299
Under the Act, a state agency, as the responsible government
entity, is required to make a written settlement offer to the
land owner.300 The settlement offer may include: (1) a transfer of development rights, (2) the issuance of a variance or
special exception, or (3) an increase in the density or intensity of the development. 30 1 Nothing in the Act indicates that
a state agency is precluded from using these land use tools.
However, traditionally, these tools are used by local, not state
or regional, governmental agencies in regulating land use.
The creation of Florida's growth management framework
had already required local governments to relinquish some of
their autonomy in the area of land use. 30 2 However, the new
297.
plans,
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Also, regional planning agencies are required to review and revise their
if necessary, every five years. See id. § 186.511.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(6)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
See id. § 70.001(6)(b).
See id. § 70.001(4)(c).
See id. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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Property Rights Act has the potential of further eroding
'home rule' in Florida, thus, creating friction between state
30 4
and local governments. 30 3 The definition of "existing use"

will potentially weaken local government authority over land
use which, in turn, will only further erode the cooperative effort between state and local governments. Under the Property Rights Act, an owner is entitled to compensation when a
government action inordinately burdens an existing use of
his land.30 5 However, existing uses include any "reasonably
foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for
the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land
uses and which have created an existing fair market value in
the property greater than the fair market value of the actual,
present use or activity on the real property." 30 6 This definition of "existing use" is so broad that it includes uses not even
contemplated by a landowner at the time of the government
action.307 It allows such an owner to present to the court an
argument of what he or she believes to be a compatible use.
From this statutory language, it appears that as long as a
reasonable basis supports the landowner's notion of a "compatible use," and that use is inordinately burdened, the property owner will prevail.
Such a prospect flies in the face of traditional local authority. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,308 upholding the validity of zoning, courts have deferred to local legislative judgment as long
as it is "fairly debatable" that the regulation advances a legitimate governmental interest.30 9 As a result, a presumption
of validity is afforded to local land use decisions. This presumption allows local governments to create long term plans
regarding the use of property within its jurisdiction by placing compatible uses adjacent to one another. Thus, decisions
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
ell, J.,

See id.
See FLA STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West Supp. 1996).
Id. § 70.001(3)(b) (emphasis added).
See Pelham, FloridaLegislature, supra note 234.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,56 (1976) (Powconcurring).
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on compatibility have rested firmly with the local legislature.
Under the new Property Rights Act, the property owner
merely has to present a rational argument in support of his
proposed land use, establishing its compatibility with adjacent land uses, in order to be compensated. Once again,
poorly financed local governments are more likely to forego
the regulation than pay compensation.3 10 Thus, the new
Property Rights Act frustrates the local legislative body's
traditional authority, adding to the tension already existing
between state and local governments.
D. The Dispute Resolution Act Seems Destined to be a
'White Elephant!
The Dispute Resolution Act also represents unchartered
territory. Logically, any process designed to resolve land use
disputes between government and private land owners
should be welcomed. That said, the adoption of this portion of
the bill cannot be divorced from the context within which it is
introduced. Despite a provision stating the opposite,3 11 the
Dispute Resolution Act is part of a property rights package.
The fact that the separate parts operate independently only
compounds the problem because the Property Rights Act pits
property owners against governmental agencies.
In addition, the Act creates a bureaucracy extensive
enough to turn any potentially interested party away.3 12 For
example, the landowner is required to exhaust all local government administrative remedies that do not go beyond four
months.3 13 Furthermore, the entire process may take up to
165 days, and even longer, if the parties agree.3 14 This may
not seem a long time when compared to litigation in court,
but it does when one considers that the law does not create a
new cause of action and is not binding on any of the parties.
The viability of the Dispute Resolution Act may ultimately depend on how the Property Rights Act fares. Cer310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See infra part IV. A.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.80 (West Supp. 1996).
See Pelham, FloridaLegislature, supra note 234.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.51(10)(a).
See id. § 70.51(23).
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tainly, if courts place the threshold for showing an inordinate
burden low enough below that for a takings, there will be little incentive for a landowner to consider dispute resolution.
If the opposite is true, where there is little difference between
a takings and an inordinate burden, then the dispute resolution process becomes an attractive process because a civil suit
is still available in the end. 315 The fact that the law is not
restricted to prospective governmental actions works in its
favor because, initially, most growth management laws will
not be subject to claims under the Property Rights Act.3 16
Yet, the passion surrounding the property rights debate will
surely dampen any positive impacts emerging from the dispute resolution process.
V. Conclusion
It is worth noting that what many had hoped would satisfy property rights advocates has not come to pass. Many
environmental and growth management supporters pursued
this compromise bill in the hope that its passage would take
the steam out of the property rights movement. 317 However,
the Tax Cap Committee is determined to place a proposed
constitutional amendment before the voters on the 1998 ballot.31 8 The proposed amendment would entitle private property owners who are challenging a government regulation to
a jury trial and money damages for any reduction in the
value of land except for a public nuisance.3 1 9 Property rights
315. See id. § 70.51(24).
316. Of course, a constitutional takings claim remains available to the property owner.
317. See Chachere, supra note 219, at 1.
318. Telephone Interview with a member of the Tax Cap Comm. (August 19,
1996). See also Randy Schultz, supra note 55, at IF; Sloan, supra note 15, at 1.
319. The proposed amendment reads:
When any action of regulation by the state, its agencies or political
subdivisions restricts the use (other than nuisances at common
law) of part or all of private real property causing a loss in fair market value of the affected real property for the public good, which in
fairness should be borne by the public as a whole, full compensation
should be paid to the owner thereof. All issues shall be determined
by jury trial in circuit court without prior resort to administrative
remedies. This provision shall apply to actions taken and regula-
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advocates are far from satisfied, indicating that the adoption
of this law accomplished little.
The property rights law was enacted to have an impact.
Viewing constitutional "taking" protection as inadequate, the
Florida Legislature established a new cause of action for individual property owners and mandated that the threshold necessary for compensation be lower than that required under a
constitutional claim. Growth management, at its purest, embraces a common vision for realizing a worthwhile future and
asks all of us to forego opportunity today to preserve opportunity for tomorrow. The Property Rights Act does little to further that cause. Nobody would argue that irresponsible
government actions should go unpunished. However, that is
not the focus of this law; responsible governmental efforts at
protecting Florida's quality of life will run afoul of this law.
As an ideal, it suggests that the common vision of Florida's
future is fractured. As an expression of the substantive
rights of landowners, it attacks the fundamental bases of a
sound growth management system.
The repeal of the Property Rights Act cannot be expected
any time in the near future. Thus, the new law imposes a
responsibility on all Floridians to pay the cost of compensation claims. Certainly, Florida's growth management, even if
somewhat hampered, will continue to survive if the general
public is willing to accept this added responsibility. Unfortunately, the current political and economic environment suggests that the public will not bear this added burden. The
ultimate victims of the Property Rights Act are the land and
the community surrounding it. In this regard, Leopold's vision of a broader "community" seems further away than ever.
"That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but
that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethtions enacted after the effective date of this amendment as well as
to applications after the effective date of this amendment of regulations enacted on or before the effective date of this amendment
without abrogating any other remedy lawfully available.
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PErTIION Fomi, TAX CAP CoMMrErrrE

(1995).
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ics. That land yields a cultural harvest is a fact long known,
3 20
but latterly often forgotten."

320.

LEOPOLD,

supra note 24, at xix.
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